

Precision Strike Annual Programs Review

"Role of Precision Engagement in Asymmetric Warfare"

April 18-19, 2006

Arlington, VA

Annual Program Review Presentation List

ROLE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Dr. John Alexander, Senior Fellow at Joint Special Operations University & Author of Future War -- with foreword by Tom Clancy -- and the sequel, Winning the War.

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS:

- Precision Effects-Storm Shadow:
 Air Vice-Marshal Nigel Day, CBE BSc(Eng) RAF (Rtd), Senior Defence Adviser (UK), MBDA Missile Systems
- Brimstone-The Royal Air Force's new Precision Strike Weapon: Mr. Jim Mulholland, Weapons Leader, No 31 Squadron RAF
- RAAF Precision Strike Programs Overview::
 Air Commodore Graham Bentley, RAAF, Air Attaché, Australian Embassy

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS PANEL--INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES:

- Raytheon Perspective:
 - Mr. Mike Booen, VP for Advanced Missile Defense and Directed Energy Weapons, Raytheon
- Northrop Grumman Perspective:
 - Mr. Dan Wildt, Director, Business Development, Directed Energy Systems
- Sol Oriens Perspective:
- Mr. Mark Fleenor, President, Sol Oriens
- Boeing Perspective:
- Dr. Robert Van Allen, Acting Director, National Teams

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT JOINT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN AFGANISTAN AND IRAQ:

Major General David C. Ralston, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center & Fort Sill

KEYNOTE SPEAKER:

Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, USA Deputy for Acquisition & Systems Management to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology

JOINT DEEP STRIKE SYSTEMS:

Small Diameter Bomb:
 Colonel Richard D. Justice, USAF, 918 ASG Commander

PRECISION ATTACK TO ENSURE DOMINANT MANEUVERS:

Viper Strike:
 Mr. Steven Borden, Deputy PM, Submunitions, Product Office Lead Systems Engineer, Submunitions

PRECISION STRIKE ACQUISITION PANEL:

• Naval Perspective: Honorable Delores Etter—Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition

PRECISION STRIKE ANNUAL PROGRAMS REVIEW – APRIL 17-18, 2006

Major General Michael A. Vane, USA

Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) (Presentation not authorized for public released)

Dr. John Alexander

Senior Fellow at Joint Special Operations University & Author of *Future War*—with foreword by Tom Clancy—and the sequel, *winning the War*.

Precision Effects—Storm Shadow: Air Vice-Marshal Nigel Day CBE BSc(Eng) RAF (Rtd)

Senior Defence Adviser (UK), MBDA Missile Systems

Brimstone—The Royal Air Force's new Precision Strike Weapon: Jim Mulholland

Weapons Leader, No 31 Squadron RAF

RAAF Precision Strike Programs Overview: Air Commodore Graham Bentley, RAAF

Air Attaché, Australian Embassy

Raytheon Perspective: Mike Booen—VP for Advanced Missile Defense and Directed Energy Weapons, Raytheon

Lockheed Perspective: *Mike Bright*—Director, Advanced Directed Energy (Presentation not authorized for public released-limited distribution only)

Northrop Grumman Perspective: Dan Wildt—Director, Business Development, Directed Energy Systems

ATK Perspective: Dr. Tony Castrogiovanni—VP Strike Weapons and Directed Energy

(Presentation not authorized for public released)

Sol Oriens Perspective: Mark Fleenor

President, Sol Oriens

Boeing Perspective: Dr. Robert Van Allen

Acting Director, National Teams

Rear Admiral David L. "Deke" Philman, USN

Deputy Commander, Joint Space and Global Strike, United States Strategic Command (still awaiting approval for distribution – please check back)

Major General David C. Ralston, USA

Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center & Fort Sill

Colonel Curis Mathis, USA

Joint IED Defeat Organization, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Presentation not authorized for public released)

Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, USA

Deputy for Acquisition & Systems Management to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology (still awaiting approval for distribution – please check back)

Brigadier General Andrew Dichter, USAF

Deputy Director, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements (Presentation not authorized for public released)

Lt Col Stephen Davis, USAF

(Presentation not authorized for public released)

Colonel Richard D. Justice, USAF

918 ASG Commander

Anthony L. Pang

Hard Target Defeat Program Manager, CXSH/CIVGS15 Department of Defense, DTRA (Presentation not authorized for public released—limited distribution only)

LTC Bill Cole, USA

Deputy PM, Combat Ammunition Systems

George M. Svitak—Deputy Director, Business Development, NetFires LLC, Raytheon Missile System (Presentation not authorized for public released)

John McVey-Guided MLRS

(Presentation not authorized for public released)

Steven Borden

Deputy PM, Submunitions, Product Office Lead Systems Engineer, Submunitions

Honorable Delores Etter—Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition

THE ROLE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

John B. Alexander, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Joint Special Operations University

PRECISION STRIKE ASSOCIATION

Crystal City, Virginia
18 April 2006

FUTURE WAR: NLW in 21st Century Warfare St. Martin's Press, 1999 WINNING THE WAR St. Martin's Press July 2003

Contact: Email: Nonlethal2@aol.com, (702) 804-5575

NON-LETHAL DEFENSE: A DEFINITION

PRAGMATIC USE OF FORCE DESIGNED
TO MINIMIZE LOSS OF LIFE WHILE
ACCOMPLISHING A MILITARY OBJECTIVE

- GOALS INCLUDE:
- NO UNINTENTIONAL LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE
- CONTROLLED LEVELS OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE
- EXPANDED OPTIONS FOR COMMANDERS

RECENT HISTORY OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

TENN VS GARNER

> 1986 DOJ CONFERENCE

IRANIAN HOSTAGE

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS


JUST CAUSE/ UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

URBAN COMBAT GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

STRATEGIC PARALYSIS

WHY NON-LETHAL WEAPONS?

- GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION
- MATURITY OF TECHNOLGY
 - NEW EFFECTS BASED CAPABILITY
 - PRECISION STRIKE AVAILABILITY
- PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
 - SOMALIA
 - HAITI
 - BALKANS
- GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
 - COMPLEX TERRAIN
 - CONTROL COLLATERAL CASUALTIES



EVOLUTION OF US MILITARY USE OF NLWS

PANAMA



HAITI





SOMALIA



KOSOVO

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES





BEANBAG ROUNDS





PepperBall Used To Stop Attacker in San Diego





PORTABLE VEHICLE STOPPER





ADVANCED NLWS ARE COMING






- NLWs make it easier to initiate war
- •- NLWs will start a new arms race
- •- NLWs may be used as instruments of torture
- •- NLWs will result in some deaths and serious injuries
- •- NLWs used as a precursor and easier to kill opponents
- •- NLWs will be used to suppress lawful dissent
- •- NLWs do not have sufficient data to support their use

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A DECADE OF CONFLICT





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
WHAT NEW ARMS RACE???



Non-Lethal Weapons are 0.012% of US DOD Budget

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
NLWS AND TORTURE



Monk with torture devices used by Chinese

TORTURE IS AN ISSUE OF HUMAN INTENT- NOT DEVICES

NLWS AND TORTURE




Monk with torture devices used by Chinese



Victoria with instruments of torture

TORTURE IS AN ISSUE OF HUMAN INTENT- NOT DEVICES



NEW SCIENTIST



NewScientist.com

"The World's No. 1 Science & Technology News Service"

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7077

Maximum pain is aim of new US weapon

19:00 02 March 2005
Exclusive from New Scientist Print Edition
David Hambling

"It could be used for torture..." John Wood, University College London

"I am deeply concerned about the ethical aspects..." Andrew Rice

"Pain researchers are furious...." David Hambling

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NLW DEATHS AND INJURIES




17 deaths with 125,000 rounds fired Probability of fatality 0.00014

Compared to what????

More than 110 deaths of children under 6



COMPARED TO WHAT?



TASER AS TARGET



CATCH 22

- 103 DEATHS FROM TASER?? (AI 14 April 06)
- ONLY 6 AUTOPSIES FIND TASER A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR
- NO INDEPENDENT RESEARCH WHAT ABOUT THE AUTOPSIES
- HOW MANY IN-CUSTODY DEATHS WITHOUT TASER?
- WHAT IS THE TIMING OF NEWS ARTICLES?
- INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE/SABOTAGE
- NO NEWS STORY EVER DIES EVEN WHEN DISPROVED

IS THERE AN AGENDA???

Amnesty International Calls For Taser Suspension

EPIDEMIC ERGOFUSION



REMEMBER DEEP THROAT

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NAILING A FOOT TO THE FLOOR



A MATTER OF CHOICE

INCAPACITATING AGENTS

WHAT YOU DID READ:

- NERVE GAS KILLED RUSSIAN HOSTAGES (UPI)
- DEADLY END TO MOSCOW SIEGE SHOWS DANGERS OF INCAPACITATING CHEMICALS (AP)
- CONCERN ARISES OVER TYPE OF GAS USED BY MOSCOW (WASH POST)



- USE OF GAS RISKS OTHERS FOLLOWING SUIT (SF CHRONICLE)

WHAT YOU SHOULD HAVE READ:

HUNDREDS SAVED BY USE OF INCAPACITATING AGENT

WOULD YOU SET TODAY'S SPEED LIMITS BASED ON AUTOMOBILE TECHNOLGY OF 1900???


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SUPPRESSING DISSENT



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HOW GOOD IS GOOD ENOUGH?



Permanent Injury (Eye Trauma) Effectiveness (Skin Pain) Effectiveness Serious Injury Non-Lethality Index (Startle) Dose

BUT WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE WHO:

- HAVE PACEMAKERS?
- EXTREME HEART CONDITIONS?
- ARE ASTHMATIC?
- ARE VERY OLD?
- ARE BLIND, DEAF MIDGETS WITH PARKINSON'S?

"Life is tough; it's tougher when you're stupid."
John Wayne as SGT John Stryker
Sands of Iwo Jima

PERCEPTION THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERING WORLD VIEWS

AIN'T IT AWFUL???


THE WORLD AS SEEN BY PHILOSOPHICAL GROUPS





THE WORLD AS IT IS





"There are two things that are infinite.....the universe and human stupidity. And I'm not sure about the former."

RECONSIDERATION OF ISSUES

- WHAT PROBLEM ARE YOU SOLVING?
- COMPLAINTS BASED ON EMOTION VS. FACTS
- BLAME TECHNOLOGY FOR HUMAN PROBLEMS
- CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL AGENTS HAVE PEACEFUL PURPOSES
- MORE OPTIONS ARE PREFERABLE TO LESS
- THE RESULTS ARE IN: NLWS ARE NOT A ROAD TO HELL

THE PRIMARY QUESTION SHOULD BE:

COMPARED TO WHAT?

COMING SOON TO A COMMUNITY NEAR YOU



IS IT BETTER THAN A ROCK?



WE NEED PRECISION STRIKE BEYOND 60 METERS: PREFER HUNDREDS OF METERS

NOW IT'S YOUR KIDS IN THE SCHOOL: WHAT WEAPONS DO YOU WANT POLICE TO USE??



THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY



Air Delivered Weapons Roadmap



Purpose

To provide the background to Roadmaps in Defence, the background for the *Air Delivered Weapons Roadmap* specifically, and to provide a summary of the outcomes at an unclassified level

Scope

Current Capability
Roadmaps in the ADF
The Air Delivered Weapons
Roadmap (ADWR)
Key outcomes

Scope

Current Capability

Roadmaps in the ADF

The Air Delivered Weapons
Roadmap (ADWR)

Key outcomes

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

- •55000 Personnel
- •Approx A\$15b (US\$11b) per annum (1.8% GDP)
- Approx A\$3-4b new capability investment per annum

'A balanced, networked and deployable force, manned by dedicated and professional people, which excels at joint and coalition operations'











F-111, F/A-18, AP-3C, Helicopters









Scope

Current Capability

Roadmaps in the ADF

The Air Delivered Weapons
Roadmap (ADWR)

Key outcomes

DEVE N

CAPABILITY ROADMAPS

CAPABILITY ROADMAP

SYSTEM ROADMAPS

TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS

Scope

Current Capability
Roadmaps in the ADF

The Air Delivered Weapons Roadmap (ADWR)

Key outcomes

N


ADWR Desired Outcomes

- set a vision for air delivered weapons to 2025 and beyond
- provide strategies that address FIC
- identify opportunities and risks
- identify key inputs and enablers

Weapons contextual issues



ADWR Methodology



Capable threat environment

- Proliferation of 4th Generation fighters (4.5th and introduction of 5th?)
- Advanced Air to Air missile systems
- Advanced Surface to Air missile systems
- Improved IADS and NCW environments
- White Paper 2000 "air combat forces that are at least comparable qualitatively to any in the region"

ADWR Weapons Technology Study

- Operational focus, rather than lab
- Seekers and sensors
- Guidance and control
- Propulsion
- Warheads and kill mechanisms
- Radiated energy weapons
- Countermeasures
- Enabling technologies
- Life cycle and logistics support

ADWR key target trends were:

- Hardened targets
- Underground targets
- Improved camouflage
- Low signature air targets
- Mobile or relocatable targets
- Non-lethal and very low collateral damage effects

Weapon requirements criteria

- Primary
 - Target type
 - Threat level
 - Targeting
 - Collateral / ROE / **Political**
 - Environment
 - Roles

- Secondary
 - Distance / time from base
 - Air power dynamics
 - Intensity
 - Support
 - Interoperability

Target types vs roles vs platforms mapping

Role	Sub-role	Mission	Buildings	Bunkers and hardened targets	Underground	Bridges	Mobile raders	Fixed Radar	Armoured Vehicles	Non-armoured vehicles	Field Equipment, machinery and support material	Personnel	Electrical/Communications infrastructure	Railway lines	Payed surfaces	POL Tanks	Mssile on launcher	Surface vessels with AD	Surface vessels without AD	Submarines	Fighters	Transports	UAVS	Mssiles in flight	Small, slowfixed wing	Helicopters
Counter Air	Offensive	OCA Attack	V	1	V		~	Y	1	4	1		V		1	1	V	1			~	Y	1	4	1	1
		Sweep							. 10												1		10			
		Force Protection																			1					
		SEAD	V.	1	V.		V	Y	1	1	1		V .				Y	1						277.00		
	Defensive	Active							, ,								4				100	A	4	×	4	×
		Land	1	~	4	4	4	Y	1000		*		4	4	4	*	4									
Strike	Maritime	Independent Surface Warfare																~	*							
		Independent Under Sea Warfare																		*						
Aerial Mining	Offensive																	~	V	1						
	Defensive															ĵ.		×	16	N.						
Offensive Air Support	Land	CAS	V	V		~	4	Y	~	V	V	4		9	~		V	8 8					- 9			
		BAI	V	~		1	V	Y	1	1	1	V	~	1	1	~	V									
	Maritime	Surface Warfare				1		1	1					1				4	*							
		Under Sea Warfare						5												1						
Information Operations	Information Warfare	PSYWAR										4	4													

Analysis criteria

- Weapon
 - range
 - accuracy
 - speed/manoeuvrability
 - signature
 - countercountermeasures
 - interoperability
 - selectable effects
 - specialised weapons
 - directed energy
 - non-lethal

- Enabling system
 - Targets
 - Threat
 - Platform

- Notes:
 - selectable effects included multipayload, variable fusing
 - specialised weapons included multitargeting, to contain wmd, loitering, deep/hard, EM disruption

Scope

Current Capability
Roadmaps in the ADF
The Air Delivered Weapons
Roadmap (ADWR)

Key outcomes

Desirable weapon characteristics

- Precision
- Selectable
- Size
- Selectable Fusing
- Penetration capability
- Jam resistant
- Third Party Targeting capability
- Range

- Commonality in planning processes
- Affordable
- Network enabled
- Informs BDA process
- Non-lethal options
- Directed Energy

Critical support requirements

- Intelligence
- Targeting requirements
- Logistics
- Infrastructure
- Training
- Interoperability
- NCW considerations

Issues to resolve

- F-18 → JSF
- Harpoon follow-on
- GPS guided munitions
- SDB
- Hellfire
- ASRAAM

ADWR Conclusion

- System Roadmap
- Focuses research
- Entry to Defence Capability Plan

Questions?

Raytheon Directed Energy Applications

When it absolutely has to get there at the "Speed of Light"

Mike Booen
Vice President
Raytheon Missile Systems
16 April 2006



Raytheon


Counter MANPADS Needs the Speed of Light

On-board protection for some aircraft...

and point protection to support expeditionary airfields



Infrared Countermeasures provide critical asset self-protection



Raytheon Vigilant Eagle protects all aircraft at the airfield


Mature? Reliable? Affordable? Logistics? CONOPS?

Raytheon

Vigilant Eagle – Mature Hardware Ready for Demonstration

MDT





C2



Off the Shelf system currently in operation

Demonstrated and operational

HPM
Live Fire Test Results





Laser-Based IR Countermeasures Use the Speed of Light

Missile Warning Coverage

Jamming Radiation

Affordable, Reliable, Light
Weight Aircraft SelfProtection Against Surface
& Air Launched Missiles


- 1. Missile launch is detected and a turret is directed onto, and tracks, the missile
- 2. A low power laser sends a modulated beam of infrared energy to the missile and jams the seeker, causing it to miss



How do you protect the helicopters?

Warfighter Benefits





- Small size, low weight, low drag ideally suited for constrained rotary wing a/c
- Proven manufacturing ability and attractive high rate production potential
- High reliability consistent with a system leveraging mature hardware / software



Pointer

 Based on Production AIM-9X Pointer



Controller

Based on Production AIM-9X Controller



Laser

Multi-band



MW Sensor

- Single color
- Multi color


Raytheon

Technology Push: Non-Lethal Technology


Force Projection



Force Protection



Facility Protection



Shout



Raytheon . . .
Filling the Void for our Customers








BACKUP

Raytheon

Vigilant Eagle





- Vigilant Eagle
 - Affordable capability to counter MANPADS terrorist threat
- HPM effect tested and proven effective in live fire against terrorist threats
 - Missile detect and track capability proven in live fire
 - C2 System Proven







Viper Strike







April 2005

Steve Borden DPM Submunitions



Viper Strike Overview





Diameter 5.5 in. Wingspan 36 in. Length 36 in. Weight 42 lb. Glide Ratio 10:1 **Explosives 2.3 lb. 14**⁰ **FOV**

- Discrete effects precision munition
 - Semi-active laser (SAL) seeker
 - Near 0m CEP ?
 - Small warhead
 - Hit-to-kill

Low Collateral Damage

- Production airframe/seeker
- Successful Army demos (9 for 9)

Path Ahead: Demonstrate improvements in 2006

• GPS Extend range to 10+ miles

 Frag belt Personnel targets, plus "less than

lethal" mode

Max range moving targets; multiple near-simultaneous target attack Datalink









ATACMS Conversion






No ATACMS
Funding to
Maintain or Test
the Current
Inventory



The Viper Strike Solution-

- Shelf Life Issue
- Maintenance Funding
- Unitary Requirement
- Viper Strike Requirement
- Bridges VS New Production








Viper Strike's Evolving Requirement

UNCLASSIFIED







Current Capabilities



- Launch Altitudes 8K' to 13K' and No Need to Maneuver
- Low Circular Error of Probability Less than One Meter CEP
- Low Collateral Damage 16 Meters for Urban Targets
- Top Down Blast Effect Limits Damage in Urban Canyons
- Moving Targets Up to 40 kph with Some Target Maneuvering
- Danger Close ATEC Approved at 50 Meters
- Double the Payload Half the Weight of Hellfire
- Multiple Laser Designations Air, Buddy, or Ground
- Day or Night Capability All Laser Designators
- Stand Off 1/2km to 1km Current; >5km w/GPS
- Current HE and Kinetic Warheads plus Frag Sleeve Funded

UNCLASSIFIED

- Only Current Munition for Class II & III Weaponized UAVS
- Capability Fielded in OIF Proven & Certified
- Active Production Facility at Redstone Arsenal
- No Munition Restrictions Beyond Aircraft Limitations



Current Missions




- · "Golden Shots"
 - Pinpoint a moving armored car in a motorcade
- Restricted (Minimal Collateral Damage) Urban Targets
 - Reach down into cordoned urban canyons
 - Near vertical angle of attack projects warhead shrapnel into the target and ground minimizing collateral damage
- Convoy & TOC ISR & Security
 - At 10K' AGL, UAVs relatively unseen, unheard, and undetectable
 - Allows observation of enemy preparations, IED placement, and ambush points
- Key Infrastructure ISR & Armed Response
 - Refineries, pipelines, politically sensitive locations, etc.
- Monitor critical situations with timely response
 - Undetected observation without ground troops in harm's way
- Army asset under Army control



Operation Iraqi Freedom Fielded & Certified!

UNCLASSIFIED





Viper Strike C-RAM Demo







UNCLASSIFIED

Viper Strike in the C-RAM Mission














Viper Strike Navigator







Current & Future Packages


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UNCLASSIFIED











Spiral Improvement Matrix


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Funding Candidates for Various Capability Improvements


	.,(or Acr	30 Pred	ator War	iot c	c.Rh	AM DASE
	CM	bc.	. Pier	Mai	sof	· c.k	DAS
• GPS Integrated	√	√				1	
• Extended Battery		1					
• Data Link (in-flight)		✓					
• Reduced Weight							
• Reduced Size							
• Frag Warhead		✓					✓
• Height of Burst Fuse	✓	✓					
• Proximity Fuse		1					
• Platform Integration	/	✓	✓		1	1	✓

Funded with Active Contracts














Page 16





Precision Strike Review

"PRECISION EFFECTS"

Air Vice-Marshal Nigel Day RAF (Rtd)
Senior Defence Adviser



PRECISION EFFECTS



- "Capability"?
- UK Air 1915 2000
- STORM SHADOW
- UK Air 2000 +



PRECISION EFFECTS



"Capability"?



"CAPABILITY"?

NCW? NEC?



"CAPABILITY"?

N

E

C



"CAPABILITY"?

NETWORK +

EFFECT =

CAPABILITY




PRECISION EFFECTS



- "Capability"?
- UK Air 1915 2000



NETWORK - 1915





EFFECTS - 1915





NETWORK

EFFECT

1915

Basic

Dumb Weapons



NETWORK

EFFECT

1915

Basic

Dumb Weapons


1990

?

?



1990





NETWORK

EFFECT

1915 Basic

Dumb Weapons

1990

Insecure Radio Dumb Weapons



PAVE WAY PRECISION WEAPONS

•USA 60s

•RAF 80s





Network Effect

1915 Basic Dumb Weapons

1990 Secure Radio Dumb Weapons

2000 TDL Precision Weapons



PRECISION EFFECT

- The Required Effect, no more, no less
- At Required Time, for Required Time, 24/7
- Across range of Decisive Opportunities



PRECISION EFFECTS




- "Capability"?
- UK Air 1915 2000
- STORM SHADOW



2003

















PRECISE EFFECT





2003 Storm Shadow first used in Operation TELIC







PRECISION EFFECTS



- "Capability"?
- UK Air 1915 2000
- STORM SHADOW
- UK Air 2000 +



BRIMSTONE 2005







METEOR






No Escape Zone









CV(F)/JCA 2020





NETWORK

EFFECT

1915

Basic

Dumb Weapons

1990

Secure Radio

Dumb Weapons

2000

TDL

Precision Weapons

2006

TDL+

Precision Effects

2020 Precision Decisions, Precision Effects (<? Minutes Kill Chain)






Precision Strike Review

"PRECISION EFFECTS"


Air Vice-Marshal Nigel Day RAF (Rtd)
Senior Defence Adviser












Strategic Environment

- Engaged in the Global War on Terror
- Quadrennial Defense Review
- Fiscal Challenges
 (FY07 Budget Submitted to Congress)







ASN (RDA) Vision

To provide weapons, systems and platforms for the men and women of the Navy/Marine Corps that support their missions and give them a technological edge over our adversaries.







ASN (RDA) Goals

- Expedite GWOT acquisition programs as much as possible without compromising safety.
- Reduce volatility in ongoing and current acquisition programs.
- Develop an investment/transition strategy for Science and Technology (S&T) to ensure future technological edge.
- Lead the Acquisition Enterprise component of the Naval Enterprise, in collaboration with OPNAV/HQMC and the fleet.







Acquisition Volatility


- Definition tending to vary often or widely
- Program characteristics that affect acquisition program volatility:
 - Program complexity
 - Requirements fluctuation
 - Budget instability
 - Schedule demands
 - Contractor/PM optimism








F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Deliveries Continue 3 Months Ahead of Schedule and On Cost



2008 —



= 1990 —


= 2000 =

-- 1987 --



AESA/JDAM/LINK 16

Precision Strike Capability over the Network



Transitioning DE Technology

There are few unexpressed thoughts ... Especially toward the end of the conference.

Lawrence M. (Mark) Fleenor

505.980.2401 M.Fleenor@SolOriensLLC.com

An Unclassified Presentation



A New Kind Of Weapon From The Pages Of Science Fiction

With A Whole List Of Real or Perceived Issues

Deep Magazine

•Lots of Shots based on

Fuel Consumption

Speed of Light

Paradigm Shifts

 Immediate attack from tactical to strategic ranges

• Impossible to outmaneuver

Balancing legacy and new requirements

> Misunderstood requirements

Precision Engagement

• High value, selectable targets

• Rapid retargeting

Controlled Effects

- Minimum collateral damage
- Ability to work in a non-lethal effects space

Competition with conventional programs

Sketchy direction



A Basic Communications Challenge

Questionable cost-benefit

Management of Technology Transition

- Balancing Tech push & User pull
- Consciously moving from basic to applied technology development, then refinement and packaging
- Forming and living up to expectations
- Matching capability with requirement
- Crafting demonstration programs
- Showing Military Utility
 - Multi-function / multi-role weapons system
 - Earning a place on a weapons platform

There has not always been a common frame of reference linking Technologists and Warfighters

"Crossing the Chasm" seems a pretty good paradigm for this sort of technology development



A Reasonable S&T Budget


\$M	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	06-11 Total	TRL 6 Date
Concept-Guided Technology								
ATL-Spiral 1 (USSOCOM)	61.0	44.0	88.0	75.0	75.0	46.0	389.0	2011
Airborne Tactical Laser (AF)	11.6	27.9	27.7	27.4	28.5	29.3	152.4	2009
GBL Counterspace Tech (AF)	8.4	8.7	7.9	8.1	7.9	8.0	49.0	2009
ABL Tech (AF)	5.2	6.1	6.4	6.7	7.4	8.1	39.9	2005,9
Relay Mirror Tech (AF)	7.8	8.7	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.6	50.4	2014
Laser Technology Prog (MDA)	43.5	48.1	48.8	50.4			190.8	2006,7
Ground Mobile Tactical HEL (Army)	29.1	35.4	41.5	47.6	47.4	50.5	251.5	2015
Ground Mobile Electronic Attack (Ar)	9.0	14.4	22.0	18.6	10.6	11.0	85.6	2012
Countermine/Counter IED (Army)	6.1	7.7					13.8	2007
Vehicle Stopper/Area Denial (Army)		4.2	10.7	18.2	12.7	9.5	55.3	2012
Anti-Sensor Tech (AF)	10.4	4.2					14.6	
Airborne Electronic Attack (AF)	17.4	17.8	17.7	18.6	18.9	19.2	109.6	2012
Airborne Active Denial (AF)	11.4	17.4	14.8	12.9	4.9	5.0	66.4	2011
FEL Scaling (Navy)	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	60.0	

...and Some Demo Programs

DE System Development Programs	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	06-11 Total	Demo Date
Airborne Laser (ABL) (MDA)	555.0	609.0	471.0	454.0	461.0	470.0	3020.0	2008
Advanced Tactical Laser ACTD (USSOCOM)	61.0	12.0					73.0	2007
Active Denial System ACTD (JNLWD)	4.3						4.3	2005

How Do You Get DE into DoD Inventory?

Established Need
Military Worth Assmt.
Capability Awareness
Measured Robustness
Measured Effectiveness
CONOPS
BDA-effect verification
Favorable Cost/Benefit
Training and Logistics



Technology Development

Some Claim
They've Done It

Applicability
Maturity
Attribute Mix
Show Effectiveness

Funding

- •S&T
- •ACTD
- Directed
- •POM

Human Effects

- Enemy
- Friendly
- Noncombatant

JAG Review

Policy Matters

T&E


Some Claim It's Impractical or Impossible

Does This Look Like Any Other Hi-Tech Weapons Program?



So What's Harder About Fielding DE?

Established Need
Military Worth Assmt.
Capability Awareness
Robustness
Effectiveness
CONOPS
BDA-effect verification
Favorable Cost/Benefit
Training and Logistics



Technology Development

There is still a basic tech maturity and product development timeline

Applicability
Maturity
Attribute Mix
Interoperability
Show Effectiveness

New Start

- •ACTD
- Directed
- •POM

Human Effects

- Enemy
- Friendly
- Noncombatant

JAG Review
Policy Matters
T & E



There are some recent
Transition success stories

Evidence of Forward Progress

as measured by recent talks at DEPS

- DE Bio-effects Overview
- Active Denial Program
- RF DE Against IED
- The NIRF System
- SPARROW Portal Protection System
- HPM Counter-Manpads Effects
- Models and Predictive Capabilities for Assessing Computer Systems
- Round-to-round Comparisons of Susceptibility Measurements for a Missile Seeker
- Vehicle Engine Stopper Historical efforts Summary
- DTRA Counter-HPM Program
- Virtual Prototyping of an HPM System



Success Path

- Continuing to target mature, useful technologies with an arguable case for military worth – and a committed early-adopter for the military capability
- Adeptness at matching non-conventional war-fighter requirements to appropriate DE Solutions
- Continuing advances in BDA, user confidence, and budget/ policy acceptance
- Executing compelling military worth demonstrations with clear and reasonable evaluation criteria
- Technology transition with appropriate emphasis on –ility issues

Technology insertion, weapons system procurement, and fielding

Adaptability and Some Measure of Patience are Required



Summary

- Transition Not Easy but Doable
- Steady advances in technology, military worth, and policy
- DE in sensible niches
- Patience and adaptability
- Enough experience to take the long view

Small Diameter Bomb



0

Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB I) Precision Strike Association Annual Program Review 19 April 2006

Col Dick Justice Commander, Miniature Munitions Systems Group richard.justice@eglin.af.mil



SDB Increment I GBU-39/B, BRU-61/A



Small Diameter Bomb

Mission:

All-weather, Autonomous, Precision Strike Decrease Collateral Damage ET HBB

Increased Loadout for Multiple Strikes Per Sortie at Standoff Ranges

Description:

IM Compliant 250 Lb Class Multipurpose Warhead Diamond-back Wing Provides Increased Range 4-place Pneumatic Carriage System



Cockpit Selectable Electronic Fuze - Impact, Height Of Burst, & Delay

Guidance:

INS/GPS Augmented by Differential GPS Anti-Jam GPS with SAASM

Platforms:

Threshold: F-15E


Objective: F-22A, F-35, F-16, F-117, A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52, MQ-9






SDB I Weapon System










Increased Loadout / Standoff



Small Diameter Bomb





4 Weapons per 1760 Station


Loadout Balanced vs Weapon Effects: 250 lb Class SDB 1



SDB I Schedule




Small Diameter Bomb





SDB I Schedule





History...Why SDB I?

ander's Intent: You Will Deliver Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) to the Warfighter in FY06. Schedule Is Paramount


Small Diameter Bomb



- •Fewer Aircraft
- Fewer Crews
- ... More Effect from Less




- Tactics
- •Laws of Armed Conflict
- "Combat" JAG




- **☑** Provide Weapon Penetration Capability
- **Minimize Collateral Damage**
- **The Provide Autonomous Target Attack**

Combat Effective in Adverse Weather

- **T** Reduce Logistics Footprint
- **Mathematical Reduce Aircraft Generation Times**
 - **Achieve Battlefield Effects Against**
 - Fixed Covered.
 - Fixed Concealed,
 - Fixed Hardened



• Changing Laws, Ops





• Global News Coverage



(JROC: Feb 2005)



SDB I Target Set



C3 Sites

- Communication Facility
- Antenna, Park Drive SATCOM

Air Defense Sites

- Radar, Revetted, EW/GCI Site
- Radar, Grill Pan

POL Sites

- POL Refinery
- POL, Large Partially Underground Tanks

Airfield Targets

- Aircraft, Fighter Revetted
- Aircraft Shelter, Large Concrete Arch
- Airfield Maintenance Complex w/ Machine Tool













SDB I Target Set (Con't)



Small Diameter Bomb

Infrastructure Targets

Transformer Yard

Missile Sites

- SCUD Missile in Travel Mode, Stationary
- BM-21 Rocket Launcher, 122mm, Stationary

Artillery Sites

ARTY, 152mm Towed Field Gun/Howitzer

AAA Sites

- ZSU-23-4, Stationary










One F-15E Loadout with SDB I Kills This Airfield... Single Sortie



Small Diameter Bomb





"Small" Can be Lethal



Small Diameter Bomb

MMTD Warhead

Small, Well-Placed, Well Designed Warheads Do Damage





SDB I Size Warhead Test





SDB I Test Status



Small Diameter Bomb

Development Portion of Seamless Verification Complete

35 for 37 Successful Flight Tests (CAD & SDD)











- Insensitive Munitions Testing Completed
- IM Certified by AF











Bullet Impact

Fragment Impact

Slow Cook-Off

Fast Cook-Off

Sympathetic Detonation

Operational Testing Ongoing



SDB I Executive Summary



Small Diameter Bomb

KPPs	Small Diam	
Requirement	Criteria	Status
Weapon Loadout	4 SDB Weapons per SDB I Carriage	√
Net-Ready (GPS Interoperability)	100% of Top-Level IERs Designated Critical. NAV Data From GPS to SDB I	✓
Thresholds		
Requirement	Criteria	Status
Range (40kft, 0.8m)	40nm	50nm
Weapon Effectiveness	17 Weapons for 14 Targets	15 for 14
F-15E Integration	4QFY06 RAA	√
AUPP Cost of \$64K (BY01\$) (\$41K Objective)	\$(24,000 Weapons) + \$(2,000 Carriage Systems) 24,000 Weapons	<\$30K
A/C Loadout	F-15E - 12 Weapons F-22A - 8 Weapons	✓



SDB I Meeting Commitments On Track for RAA 4QFY06



Small Diameter Bomb



BRIMSTONE

The Royal Air Force's New Precision Strike Weapon



Squadron Leader Jim Mulholland 31 Sqn's Weapons Leader



Aim

 Leave you with a lasting impression of the capability of the Royal Air Force's latest precision strike weapon

BRIMSTONE.





Classification



Scope

- Capability Gap
- BRIMSTONE
- Evaluation
- The Future
- Summary.




Scope

Capability Gap.



Capability Gap





Capability Gap

Mobile Relocatable

- Precision
- Effect
- Time
- Range
- Low Collateral
- Interoperability
- Growth Potential

Selective

— Precision

— Effect

-At

Area

Range

Soft

Semi Hard

Hard

Very Hard and Deeply Buried



UNCLASSIFIED

Capability Gap

■ Precision ✓ Yes

■ Effect ✓ Yes

■ Time ✓ Yes

■ Range ✓ Yes

■ Low Collateral ✓ Yes

■ Interoperability ✓ Yes

■ Growth Potential ✓ Yes.



Scope

- Brimstone:
 - Requirements
 - Overview (seeker, missile)
 - Employment
 - Attack Mode
 - Video Simulation.



Brimstone Requirements

- Minimum Crew Workload
- Autonomous / Fire and Forget
- Multiple Kills per pass
- All weather / 24 Hour operation
- Modular to ease growth potential
- Currently highly effective against a wide variety of:

APCs

ADUs

SPGs

MBTs









Brimstone

- Weapon Comprises:
 - An All Up Round from the container
 - A re-useable 3 rail 1760 launcher
 - Up to 3 Missiles per Salvo
 - Up to 12 Missiles per jet
 - Built In Test.





Brimstone

Designed to:

- Defeat armoured targets
- Launch from high speed fixed wing
- Multiple or single missile firing
- Supersonic cruise
- 3 attack scenarios.








Brimstone Seeker

- Active 94 GHz FMCW radar 'push-broom'
- Autonomous / Fire and forget capability
- All weather / night
- Terrain avoidance
- Real time target detection and classification.








Brimstone Missile

- Mass, electrical and mechanical external interfaces are all similar to the Hellfire Missile
- Operation in a high speed environment .



Brimstone Employment


- Manual data entry future
- Target position (Lat, Long, Alt), start search, stop search, self destruct, attack mode.



Brimstone Attack Mode

Point Attack:

- Select number of missiles
- Search in the same area self destruct
- Direct or indirect.






Brimstone Attack Mode

Column Attack:


- Select number of weapons 3 or 6 Missiles
- Each missile engages nth target
- Dependent on the number of weapons and the release order.





Brimstone Attack Mode

- Area Attack:
 - Select 1 to 4 weapons 3 to 12 Missiles
 - Missiles generate different target search areas based on target position, weapon number and release order.



Brimstone Video Simulation





Scope



Evaluation.



Evaluation

- Between Jan to Dec 2005 evaluation, and acceptance trials
- IOC Mar 2005, FOC Dec 2005
- Extensive RAF Service Evaluation Trials:
 - All attack modes
 - Stationary and moving targets
 - Single missile and weapon salvoes
 - 22 missiles fired, 21 hits
- Mature, capable and rigorously tested.



Scope

The Future.



The Near Future

- Now available as a weapon of choice for Operations
- Apr 06 full integration in a SEAD scenario, 'Sensor to Shooter'
- Evolution of the Tornado employment tactics against SEAD defences
- Brimstone DEAD?



The Future

- Sea trials have confirmed tracking capability
- Naval target arrays:
 Boghammar, Boston Whaler,
 Zodiac H1010, Future
 Catamaran
- Seeker Algorithms:
 - DEAD, sea targets, urban environments, man made structures.









The Future

- Insensitive Munitions
- Increased range
- Data Link









Scope

Summary.



Summary

- ✓ Precision
- ✓ Effect
- ✓ Time
- ✓ Range
- ✓ Low Collateral
- ✓ Interoperability
- ✓ Growth Potential


- ✓ Snipe to Area
- ✓ ERA
- √ Simple + Supersonic
- ✓ Out of danger
- ✓ Minimal
- ✓ Fast-Jet Proven 1760 – US ahead
- ✓ Modular Incremental
 - ✓ This is already a production Missile



Summary

- Thomas Edison:
 "There is a way to do things better find it"
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
 - "In the early days of my career it would have taken 21 jaguar aircraft bombers to take out a single Soviet tank. Now one aircraft equipped with Brimstone could take out a dozen tanks"
- If you are still unsure or are considering a career operating for an opposing force inside an armoured vehicle





The End



Squadron Leader Jim Mulholland 31 Sqn's Weapons Leader





Joint Combat Operations

MG David C. Ralston
Chief of US Army Field Artillery



Agenda



- Joint Fires Training
- Joint Precison Targeting
- Precision Munitions
- C-RAM



No "Single" Service School Established to Train Fires & Effects Above the Brigade Level (Lethal and Non-Lethal) in Support of the Joint Force Commander.

Ft Sill Developed Joint Operational Fires & Effects Course (JOFEC) Sep 04

5 Courses taught to date, Scheduled 4 x per Year (Anticipate 8) with 30 students per course

Focuses on Operational Level Fires & Effects

Emphasizes both Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires & Effects, IO, Space and EBO

Recent innovations include Counterinsurgency and Coalition Issues as topics



Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course



In JFCOM Course Catalog

Overwhelming Request for Attendance; Extensive Waiting List

Attendance breakout—14 Army, 4 USAF, 4 USMC, 4 USN, 4 SOCOM

<u>Desired End State</u>: Highly Trained Joint Service Members Capable of Flawlessly Integrating and Executing Joint Fires & Effects in Support of the JFC



Joint Fires Observer (JFO) Concept



Army has Identified the Need for increased Terminal Attack Control Capability. Air Force is Increasing JTAC Structure Beginning FY06.

<u>Army-Air Force-SOCOM JFO MOA Signed (Nov 05).</u>

JFO Definition Approved – "A trained service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 CAS terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO)."



Joint Fires Observer (JFO) Concept



Extends the reach of JTACs.

Focus on Sergeant (E-5 or Above) Fire Support Specialist.

JFO Training at Nellis AFB (AGOS) and Ft Sill.
JTAC-JFO Train and Fight as "One Team."

Desired End State: 1 JFO per Maneuver Platoon (Approximately 3,200).



JFO Training at Fort Sill



- Developed JFO Training Capability at Fort Sill (Aug 05).
- •JFO Course Training Syllabus jointly approved by USA and USAF.
- •Six Courses conducted to date.
- Courses conducted with simulation and live fly.
- •Anticipate Class Size of 18-20 students Per Class By Jun 06; 270 trained JFOs projected for FY 06.
- •FY 07-08 goal is 400-500 JFOs (20 Classes Per Year).
- •USAF has agreed to continue JFO training at Nellis AFB until FY 08.
- •Desired End State: 1 JFO per Maneuver Platoon (Approximately 3200).



JFO Training at Fort Sill



- Air Force Detachment re-established. FY 06 End Strength is 8-10 personnel.
- Ft. Sill investments include both systems and instructors.
- JFOs receive training/familiarization on Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF).
- Course submitted, approved and included in JFCOM Course Catalog.
- Desired End State: A fully resourced course, manned with adequate instructors and operators, equipped with simulators, with access to ranges for live sorties, producing JFOs to meet Army requirements.



Joint Targeting



2004 - 2005
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Mensuration Performed
Only at AOC (Theater Level)
with
no "Eyes On Target"





Joint Targeting



2006 →...

Operation Iraqi Freedom
Precision Coordinates Performed
by

Ground Based Observers

"Fund On Townsh"

"Eyes On Target"



Placing precision strike <u>Capabilities</u>


at the Tip of the Sword



Return of Air Force Detachment to Fort Sill (Ongoing Since 15 May 05)



- USAF supportive and working issues to provide manning and support.
- Anticipated AF Detachment FY06 End Strength by is 8-10.
 - Currently 6 on station.
- USAF (ACC) pursuing FY 08 POM support for manning.
- OK Air National Guard manning will 'bridge' through FY07.
- FY 08 unit will include both USAF Active Duty and OK Air National Guard personnel.
- Linkage established with USAF units for live fly opportunities for JFO Course and sustainment training.
 - Working with 7 different flying units.
 - Urban CAS Scenarios included with B-52s from Barksdale AFB (Targeting Pods) and B-1s from Dyess AFB.
- Desired End State: Fully integrated Air Force Detachment, enabling better Air-Ground Operations and development of Army/Joint Doctrine.





Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF)



Requirement

- "Digital Divide" still exists for Precision Engagement by Tactical Users
- ✓ Strikes still called over voice nets using "non-integrated" GPS, LRF, map and compass
- √ Coordinates lack pedigree for PGMs
- ✓ Different delivery platforms require coordinates in different formats

Background

- National Geospatial Intelligence
 Agency (NGA) validated capability for
 PGM targeting and mission planning
- ✓ Hosted on user's existing systems
- √ First deployed to OEF in DEC 2001

Discussion

- Common component in emerging Service Programs of Record
- ✓ SOCOM Special Operations Mission Planning Enhancement
- **✓ USAF TACP-Modernization**
- **✓ USMC StrikeLink**
- ✓ AFSOC Battlefield Air Operations Kit
- ✓ USA Forward Observer System


Status


- In use by SEALs, Special Forces, USA FECs, USAF Special Tactics, USMC Force RECON and MEU Intel
- Training integrated at JTAC and JFO Schools
- Transitions to USSOCOM in FY07 for sustainment
- Recognized by USCENTCOM for targeting



Example PSS-SOF Targeting Sequence















Precision Munitions



- Guided MLRS, Excalibur
- 24/7, All weather
- Minimizes collateral damage
- Supports COIN Ops
- Field Artillery is transforming to a Precision Strike Combat Arm!!!



GMLRS Unitary



Range to Target – 74 KM





First Validation Shot



- 4 x 5 Meter Target
 - 53 Kilometers
 - Point Detonation





First Validation Shot







Second Validation Shot



- 50 x 200 Foot Target
- 65 Kilometers
- Point Detonation and Delay







Second Validation Shot







GMLRS Unitary OIF 10 Sep 05







Excalibur



Range to Target – 15 KM





Excalibur



Range to Target – 15 KM





C-RAM




- Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar
 - System of systems to counter the indirect fire threat
 - 7 Pillars
 - •Shape, Sense, Warn, Protect, Intercept, C2, Respond
- Successful in Theater and at NTC



C-RAM at NTC



Integrated Base Defense System of Systems (IBDSoS)



WTSI Camera

LCMR (Constructive)



C-RAM155mm Response







C-RAM Hellfire Response









Joint Combat Operations

MG David C. Ralston
Chief of US Army Field Artillery

Precision Strike Association




MG Jeff Sorenson

Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) April 19, 2006

Agenda

- Current Strategic Environment
- What is Precision?
- Jerry McGuire "Show Me The Money!"
- Future Investment Strategy
- Industrial Base Viable or Declining?

A Complex Strategic Environment



Munitions Terminology

Precision Munitions

Capable of self locating and maneuvering to a specific location with an accuracy sufficient to yield a high probability of destruction within its inherent capabilities.

Smart Munitions

Self-contained capability to search, detect, acquire, and engage individual targets by detecting the general target characteristics in order to provide terminal guidance for the munition or submunitions.

Discriminating Munitions

Self-contained capability to search, detect, acquire, and engage individual targets by distinguishing specific characteristics of the target to selectively identify and engage only the desired target types.

Precision Munitions -- Why?

- All-weather, terrain, and operational environment engagement capability that reduces operational risk by providing immediate responsive fires and scalable effects
- Minimize collateral damage, especially in urban settings; allows for discriminating use of force
- Reduce number of rounds needed to defeat targets at all ranges (same CEP at any range)
- Reduce logistics footprint and force burden
- Essential to fulfill objectives of Transformation and Joint opns
- Compliment -- <u>not replace</u> unguided or 'dumb' munitions

Precision Munitions – Why Not?


- Not every target needs to be destroyed suppression, masking, or harassing fire is often needed to shape the battle
- Unaffordable <u>if</u> chasing too many programs with limited resources
- Insufficient numbers if they become the weapon of choice
- Dependent on sensor system data, rapidly passed networked information, especially when addressing fleeting targets
- PGM technology is developing ahead of doctrine and infrastructure – modernizing weapons without modernizing doctrine may lead to ineffective use of PGMs

Misconceptions

- A replacement for unguided munitions but "dumb" is still good
- A leap-ahead advantage but temporary since eventually precision will proliferate and put our own forces at risk
- Leads to quick victory but the enemy does not always behave the way we think we would
- Technology Will Save Us...
 - -- PGMs are not a replacement for sound tactics or strategy (do not confuse the ways and means of war with its end)
 - -- PGMs as the 'silver bullet' but weapons break; human error; enemy countermeasures; not a replacement for doctrine, tactics, or the human element (leadership; will to win; luck)


President's Budget (FY01-FY11)

U.S. Army Total (FY01 to FY11) = \$1.3 Trillion



Army Research, Development And Acquisition Summary (FY01-FY11)

RDA Total (FY01 to FY11)= \$304.4 Billion




Top Ten Army Programs (2000 vs. 2006)


FY 2000 Top MDEPs	FY 2006 Top MDEPs	
•TRAINING AMMUNITION	•FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS)	
•LONGBOW APACHE	•TRAINING AMMUNITION	
•TECHNOLOGY BASE	•TECHNOLOGY BASE	
•ABRAMS	•STRYKER	
•FIRE SUPPORT MISSILES	•Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)	
•MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE (MTV) SYSTEMS	•TACTICAL RADIOS	
•JAVELIN	•CH-47F Upgrade Recap	
•HORIZONTAL BATTLEFIELD DIGITIZATION	•ARMY TEST INFRASTRUCTURE	
•COMANCHE	•Apache AH-64D Upgrade Recap	
•BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SYSTEM (BFVS)	•BLACKHAWK	

Tactical Missile Procurement

Dollars In Thousands



Missiles/Ammo Initial Unit Cost



Precision Munitions (Fielded & Developmental)

FIELDED PRODUCTION SYSTEMS:

TOW 2B
JAVELIN
HELLFIRE variants -- SAL (K, M, or N) and LONGBOW (L)
ATACMS Block IV – Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU)

SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPMENT OR S&T:

PEO AMMO: PEO MISSILES and SPACE:

Excalibur


PGMM CKEM NLOS LS -- PAM

MRM APKWS II NLOS LS -- LAM

PGK JCM – Technical GMLRS

Maturation

Joint Fires Capabilities



Missiles Expenditures

	GULF WAR 1	GWOT
Air		
Hellfire/Longbow	1770	3441
Anti-Tank Infantry		
Javelin	N/A	682
TOW	2202	5430
Artillery		
MLRS	10,572	840
GMLRS	N/A	54
Unitary	N/A	16
ATACMS (Blk 1)	32	371
ATACMS (Blk 2)	N/A	69

Capabilities for a Joint and Expeditionary Army

Current Force



~100 lb. load



70+ tons




< 10 mph

Enabling the Future Force

Science and Technology—

develop and mature
technology to enable
transformational capabilities
for the Future Modular Force
while seeking opportunities
to accelerate technology
directly into the Current
Modular Force

Enhancing the Current Force



Today's Science & Technology Investments for Future Precision Strike Capabilities

Missiles



Smaller, Lighter, Cheaper Munition Components (SLMC)

- Miniaturize electronic assemblies
- Chip-scale packaging
- Advanced sensors and gimbals

Next Gen NLOS-LS

Loitering Attack Missile Increased Loiter time(> 30 min)





Lasers

- Counter-rocket, artillery & mortars
- Disrupt/defeat EO/IR sensors
- Scaleable effects



High Energy Solid State Laser

Munitions



Common Smart Submunition

- Discriminating I2R & LADAR Sensors
- Long, Aerostable EFP
- 155mm, 105mm, PGMM & GMLRS Applications




120mm Mid Range

Munition


- Range 2-12km (BLOS)
- Autonomous or Laser Designated Seeker Modes
- Hit to Kill

Multi-purpose Warheads


- Single warhead defeats bunkers, heavy/light armor & personnel
- Enhanced Shaped Charge blast/fragmentation warhead
- Hardened for bash-through capability against reinforced structures




S&T Investments Enabling Precision Strike Capabilities FY97-11, \$3B*




Industrial Base – Family Tree



Missile Sector Industrial Base Consolidations




Active Army Ammunition Plants (AAPs) - Government Owned



Numbers shown do not include plants in layaway and "semi-active" status.

Success Story



Program of Record (2001)


- Did not Include Unitary
- Focused on DPICM "Only" Solution

World Events Change &
New Requirements Evolve

Program of Record (2003)

- Included Unitary
- Envisioned Urgent Need Variant
- · Considered Warhead Improvements

Urgent Need Variant
(Dual Mode Fuze & Basic Motor)
Fielded and 41 Operationally Employed
2005



Way Ahead

- Investment Strategy for Precision Weapons Portfolio Needs Review
- Precision Lethality System of Systems Evaluation
- Enormous Stockpile Demil or Refit?
- S&T Strategy: Sub-Components Improvements or New Technology?
- Industrial Base Declining; Cost of Weapons Increasing





Precision Strike – Industry Perspective "Closer than you think"

Bob Van Allen Program Director HEL and EO Systems

The Promise

Missile Defense Systems

HEL Attributes


- Speed of light engagement
 High precision offers low collateral damage
 Graduated damage effects
 Concurrent sensing
- capabilities
- Deep magazine potential
- Standoff range

Challenges

- Field of regard limited to
- Line of Sight

 Atmospheric losses over long propagation lengths

 Availability subject to weather: Clouds and obscurants limit field of engagement




HEL Programs Are In Integration and Field Test

Missile Defense Systems

Airborne Laser (ABL)

Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL)

HEL Relay Systems ("redirected energy"



HEL Technology is Maturing

Missile Defense Systems




Hurdles

Missile Defense Systems

- System/technology readiness
- Military utility and effects
- Development/ life cycle cost
- Development Funding
- Policy








Growing Laser Weapons Capability



- Tactical High Energy Laser has shot down:
 - Rockets
 - ■122mm-Katyusha
 - Short range ballistic missile
 - Artillery
 - Mortars











Airborne Laser (ABL)



High Power Laser:


- World's First MW-Class COIL Laser
- World's First MW-Class Airborne Laser
- Demonstrated weapons-class power full duration run in 2005




Solid-state Lasers

 Solid-State Laser Programs approaching militarily significant power levels









Operational Implications

- Balancing the strengths of laser weapons against their operational limitations makes them well suited to roles in two key mission areas:
 - Active Defense: providing air, land, sea, and space platforms the ability to defend themselves, other platforms, and large areas against missiles, aircraft, bombs, artillery shells, or rockets.
 - Offensive Strike: providing the capability to achieve lethal or non-lethal effects against a range of suitable targets.



Defensive Operations

- Air Platform Active Defense
 - Increases the survivability of aircraft
 - Reduces SEAD requirements







Ground-based Laser Defenses



- Increases ground force survivability
- Enhances freedom of maneuver



Naval Self Defense

Provide fleet defense against wide spectrum of threats





Defense of Critical Infrastructure

Protect critical infrastructure against range of threats













Offensive Operations

 Most likely dedicated to missions where precision, speed, numbers of engagements are more important than pure destructive power.









A Wake-up Call for Warfighters

 Accelerating trend toward increased lethality in many dimensions of the battlespace threatens U.S. offensive dominance...

Triple digit SAMs

BVRAAMS

Supersonic ASCMs

TBMs

Indirect fire PGMs



























Conclusion

Laser weapons can potentially reverse that trend by increasing the ability of U.S. forces to defend against threats that are otherwise difficult or almost impossible

to defeat









